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A jury is an unpredictable group. Each of the twelve 
jurors on a case could have a different and separate reason for 
reaching a verdict. The jury in each criminal case is asked to 
determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant, and in some 
cases that guilty verdict could lead to a death sentence for the 
accused. With a person’s life at stake, the criminal justice 
system should take every possible precaution to make sure the 
jury is properly informed (while not misled) to make this 
decision. If a defendant suffers from mental deficiency or 
diminished capacity, relevant evidence in that regard must be 
presented to the jury for the twelve jurors to reach a properly 
informed decision. Evidence of mental deficiency or disability 
can be relevant to defendant’s mental culpability – mens rea – 
for the crime, but these defects or disorders also explain a 
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defendant’s mannerisms and responses, both outside of court, 
and in full view of the judge and jury. For this reason, jurors 
should always be allowed to view or hear evidence that relates 
to a defendant’s mental defect, disorder, or disability. 
Particularly in cases involving social disorders such as 
Asperger’s Syndrome (“AS”) and High-Functioning Autism 
(“HFA”), introducing the diagnosis to the jury could explain 
why the Defendant had particular reactions to other witnesses 
or victims before, during, or after the crime and why the 
defendant seems to lack remorse or normal social functioning 
in the courtroom. Without knowing and understanding a 
defendant’s mental disorder, the jurors could misinterpret the 
defendant’s social actions or lack of remorse as evidence of 
guilt.  
I. MENTAL/SOCIAL DISORDERS 
A number of mental/social disorders are closely 
related to and are parts of autistic spectrum disorders, 
including autism, HFA, AS, Deficits in Attention Motor 
Control and Perception (“DAMP”) syndrome, and other 
disorders that are based purely on observable behaviors.1 
These disorders are complex and new research regarding 
these disorders is surfacing constantly. Many of these 
disorders are related; one disorder could be mistaken for 
another, or an individual could be suffering from more than 
one of these or related disorders at the same time.2  
Asperger’s Syndrome and HFA have been 
characterized as milder forms of autism, but each disorder 
varies widely in degree.3 Characteristics of AS include social 
isolation, oddness, obsessive special interests, eccentric or 
pedantic use of language, physical clumsiness, and sensory 
                                                 
1 Maria Rhode, Asperger’s Syndrome: A Mixed Picture, 31 
PSYCHOANALYTIC INQUIRY 288, 288 (2011); Lotta Dellve, Lars 
Cernerud, and Lillemor R.-M. Hallberg, Harmonizing Dilemmas: 
Siblings of Children with DAMP and Asperger Syndrome’s Experiences of 
Coping with Their Life Situations, 14 SCAND J CARING SCI 172, 172 
(2000). 
2 Rhode, supra note 1, at 288. 
3 Id. 
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hypersensitivity.4 For example, a coin collector who lives for 
his hobby, has no close friends, feels overwhelmed by bright 
lights and loud noises, has difficulties communicating with 
people, and is bewildered by social cues would fit the typical 
profile of a person suffering from AS or HFA.5 
A problem arises in the court system when dealing 
with defendants who suffer from AS. First, the disorder is 
widely misunderstood by the general population and by most 
jury members. The disorder also varies in degree from person 
to person and there is no way to objectively measure such 
degrees as this disorder is based purely on observable 
behaviors.6 While low-functioning Autism will almost 
undoubtedly qualify a defendant as intellectually disabled and 
incompetent to stand trial, AS and HFA likely will not.7  The 
overlap between autism and mental retardation seems 
obvious, but courts in capital punishment states routinely hold 
there is no such correlation.8 The Supreme Court of Florida has 
held that while a diagnosis of AS serves purposes for 
mitigation, AS is considered a mere “mental illness [and] does 
not serve as a bar to execution.”9 The court’s decision was 
rendered in a case involving a defendant with AS, who was 
only eighteen years old and had the developmental and 
emotional age of twelve to thirteen.10 Louisiana has even 
included in its state law that a diagnosis of autism is not 
equivalent to a finding of mental retardation.11 With courts 
making blanket decisions about AS and whether or not it rises 
to the level of mentally retarded, the need increases for the 
                                                 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
6 Id.  
7 Nita A. Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 859, 896-97 (2009) (citing Eric Fombonne, Epidemiology of Autistic 
disorder and Other Pervasive Developmental Disorders, 66 J. CLIN. 
PSYCHIATRY 3, 4 (Supp. 10) (2005)) (Almost 70% of persons suffering 
from a disorder under the autistic spectrum meet the diagnostic 
medical criteria to be classified as mentally retarded, and 30% do 
not.). 
8 Farahany, supra note 7, at 898.  
9 Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 563 (Fla. 2010). 
10 Id. at 543-44. 
11 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(H)(2)(a) (2008). 
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public, especially jurors, to be aware of AS, its symptoms, and 
how it affects behaviors and thoughts. 
 
II. PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Many courts have excluded evidence of psychiatric 
experts involving AS and HFA claiming any probative value 
would be substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing 
the jury causing members of the jury to speculate on how the 
disorder affected the defendant.12 However, when the jury 
does not have this information, the jurors are left to assume 
the defendant has a normal brain which is socially functional. 
This situation actually creates a higher danger of juror 
confusion, because many social mannerisms exhibited by a 
person suffering from AS or HFA are very similar to reactions 
associated with a guilty mind.  
If a defendant looks down at the table during the entire 
trial, jurors could interpret it to mean the defendant is 
ashamed and cannot bear to face the victims, witnesses, 
attorneys, or judge. In reality, looking down at the table may 
be something very common for persons with AS or HFA 
because isolation is a characteristic of both disorders.13 A jury 
lacking knowledge of the defendant’s mental conditions is 
very dangerous for the accused, who could be unfairly viewed 
in a different light just because of the mannerisms that are 
symptoms of these mental conditions. There is no existing 
danger, as prosecutors argue, in equipping the jury with 
relevant facts about the defendant’s mental conditions. The 
danger of prejudice lies with not introducing the evidence. 
Reports have found persons suffering from AS or HFA 
have a greater history of violent behaviors14 and a greater 
tendency toward violent crime, including murder.15 Several 
different hypotheses have been suggested to explain the 
association of AS with violent crime, including “lack of 
                                                 
12 Minnesota v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 235 (Minn. 2010). 
13 Rhode, supra note 1, at 288. 
14 M. R. Woodbury-Smith, High functioning autism spectrum disorders, 
offending and other law-breaking: findings from a community sample, 17 J. 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 108 (2006). 
15 D. M. Schwartz-Watts, Asperger’s disorder and murder, 33 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 390, 390 (2005). 
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empathy, social naiveté, excessive interests getting out of 
control,” and sexual preoccupations.16 However, this evidence 
does not prove having AS or HFA equates to a lack of intent. 
Expert psychiatric evidence would give the jury better insight 
into how the individual’s mind operates on a daily basis. The 
jury would still be free to determine, using the evidence 
presented, whether the defendant acted with the requisite 
intent. No expert can testify as to whether a person is guilty of 
a crime. This determination has always been and will be left to 
the jury.  
Most states require the prosecution to prove intent to 
kill as an element of a murder conviction, and the jury must 
consider the defendant’s subjective state of mind to determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt whether that requisite intent 
existed at the time of the crime.17 In states that do not 
recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity, the jurors are 
left to speculate as to the mental state and brain functioning of 
a defendant whose mental state falls just shy of qualifying for 
an insanity defense. Minnesota courts, in particular, have held 
that psychiatric testimony cannot be used to disprove a 
defendant’s subjective state of mind – at the time of the crime 
– during the guilt phase of trial.18 “Without the doctrine of 
diminished capacity, an offender is either wholly sane or 
wholly insane, and criminal liability cannot be based on the 
degree of sanity an offender possesses.”19 However, as most 
psychiatrists would agree, mental health is not a black or 
white issue, but operates along a continuum,20 yet this black or 
white/sane or insane decision is left up to a lay jury as it tries 
                                                 
16 Stewart S. Newman & Mohammad Ghaziuddin, Violent Crime in 
Asperger Syndrome: The Role of Psychiatric Comorbidity, 38 J. AUTISM & 
DEV. DISORDERS 1848, 1849 (Nov. 2008) (citing Y. Kohn, et. al., 
Aggression and sexual offense in Asperger’s syndrome, 35 ISRAEL J 
PSYCHIATRY 293 (1998)). 
17 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 140-41 (1997). 
18 Minnesota v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2010) (citing 
Minnesota v. Peterson, 764 N.W.2d 816, 821-22 (Minn. 2009); 
Minnesota v. Bird, 734 N.W.2d 664, 677-678 (Minn. 2007); State 
Minnesota v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 104 (Minn. 1992); Minnesota v. 
Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 763-64 (Minn. 1990); Minnesota v. Jackman, 
396 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Minn. 1986). 
19 Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at  237.  
20 Minnesota v.Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982). 
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to decide the mental state of a defendant without proper 
expert evidence on the issue. Determining the subjective 
mental state of the defendant without the aid of an expert 
seems challenging at best. Add on the fact that the defendant 
might be exhibiting unexplained, odd, and guilty-looking 
mannerisms, and the task approaches impossibility.  
 
III. THE M’NAGHTEN TEST FOR INSANITY 
Most jurisdictions use some variation of the 
M’Naghten test to determine whether a defendant is insane for 
purposes of trial. This test comes from an English case in 1843 
in which the House of Lords held that the defendant would be 
able to assert an insanity defense if, “at the time of committing 
the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of 
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature 
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, [he] 
did not know he was doing what was wrong.”21 Therefore, if 
the defendant failed to know that what he was doing was 
either wrong or illegal or did not know the nature and quality 
of his act, he should receive a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity. This M’Naghten Rule addresses awareness, an 
essential component of mens rea or intent, but awareness alone 
cannot suffice to fully explain a defendant’s mental state. The 
human mind is a complex system of many mechanisms a lay 
jury could not be expected to comprehend. What if the 
mechanism that separates the knowing from the acting, the 
feedback loop, is the mechanism impaired?22 Assessing a 
defendant’s awareness is not enough to understand his mental 
state.23  
“For defendants whose mental illness manifests itself 
by an inability to self-govern, it is unjust that their knowledge 
of the act’s guilty nature denies them reprieve.”24 Schwarz 
describes how intent formation, having the express purpose of 
committing the crime, and awareness of the illegality of the 
                                                 
21 ROBINSON, supra note 18, at 512 (citing M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. 
Rep. 718, 722 (1843)).  
22 Charlotte Schwarz, Irreconcilable Differences: Mens Rea and Mental 
Illness, 20 WRITING IN & ABOUT MED. 41, 44 (Spring 2009). 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
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crime, work in a feedback loop, but each is neurologically 
distinct.25 This creates a fundamental asymmetry between law 
and medicine, as the law seeks to analyze guilt.26 Situations 
that are more grey than black and white must be explained by 
an expert before any layperson on a jury can begin to 
understand the concepts at issue.  
The underpinnings of such neurological and 
psychiatric diagnoses as AS and HFA are complex neural 
systems which remain at odds with M’Naghten’s one-
dimensional constraint to deliver an unequivocal verdict, and 
the gradients of mental illness are overlooked, resulting in a 
forced conformity.27 In a society where death is still a viable 
punishment for crime, every level of mental illness must be 
examined during trial. The jury can still weigh the facts before 
them, but justice requires that the jury have all of the facts 
relevant to guilt. State prosecutors will argue that introducing 
evidence of mental illnesses that do not rise to the level of 
insanity might cause the jury to associate the mental illness 
with a lack of intent, but the jurors are left to weigh those facts. 
If our justice system leaves any room for error, that error 
should be on the side of life. 
 
IV. IN MINNESOTA V. ANDERSON, A MINNESOTA COURT 
SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE OF ASPERGER’S SYNDROME 
In Minnesota v. Anderson, Minnesota courts denied 
expert testimony which would have established that the 
defendant was suffering from AS and suppression of this 
testimony stripped Anderson of a fair trial.28 Minnesota state 
courts have held that introduction of probative psychiatric 
testimony is overshadowed by the risk of confusing juries as 
to the legal elements of intent and premeditation, and that 
legal definitions of each are outside of a psychiatrist’s 
practice.29 However, in Anderson’s case, and likely many 




28 Minnesota v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 234 (Minn. 2010). 
29 Brittany E. Bachman, CRIMINAL LAW: SUBJECTIVE INQUIRY INTO A 
DEFENDANT’S STATE OF MIND: SHOULD PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT 
TESTIMONY BE ALLOWED TO DISPROVE MENS REA?-- MINNESOTA V. 
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other similar cases, defense attorneys sought to introduce 
evidence of AS to help the jury understand how the disorder 
affected many parts of Anderson’s life.30  
The suppressed expert testimony would have 
explained that AS impairs an individual’s ability to socialize, 
communicate, empathize, or understand and respond 
properly to social cues,31 and persons with AS lack an 
understanding of what is socially acceptable.32 The court in 
Anderson believed that this was lay evidence, and that the jury 
could determine this type of general information without the 
help of an expert.33 Both AS and HFA are rare, complex, and 
misunderstood disorders. Expert testimony would be 
absolutely necessary to avoid juror confusion, yet the state’s 
attorney argued the evidence would lead to exactly that. As 
the jurors viewed Anderson’s demeanor and facial 
expressions, they had no way of knowing these reactions were 
a result of his disorder. The judge even said to Anderson: 
“You have shown no remorse, no empathy, and I have no 
sympathy for you.”34 The jurors would have surely perceived 
Anderson differently if they had known of his inability to 
empathize and respond to social cues. Suppressing such 
evidence was clear error and unfairly prejudiced Anderson 
during his trial. 
Persons affected by AS or HFA have an odd, pedantic 
manner of speaking35 and poor nonverbal communication.36 
As Anderson’s attorneys argued, although it fell upon deaf 
ears, these symptom-driven actions and mannerisms, both in 
the courtroom and in his behavior toward witnesses around 
the time of the event, can and will look negatively upon the 
defendant. Anderson’s appearance was described as odd and 
                                                                                                       
ANDERSON, 789 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2010), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
491, 503 (2011). 
30 Anderson, at 227. 
31 Id. at 235. 
32 Id. at 233. 
33 Id. at 233-34. 
34 Bachman, supra note 30, at 510-11. 
35 A. Klin, D. Pauls, R. Shultz & F. Volkmar, Three diagnostic 
approaches to Asperger’s syndrome: Implications for research, 35 J. AUTISM 
& DEV. DISORDERS 221, 223 (2005). 
36 See L. Wing, Asperger’s Syndrome: A clinical account, 11 Psychol. 
Med. 115 (1981). 
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scary, and this was unfairly prejudicial against him all because 
of his mental and social disorder. The expert testimony, if it 
had been admitted, would have allowed the jury to 
understand his appearance and actions.  
 
V. A NON-TESTIFYING DEFENDANT IS STILL AT RISK WHEN 
EXPERT TESTIMONY IS SUPPRESSED 
The argument for introduction of expert testimony 
remains even if the defendant does not take the witness stand 
to testify. The defendant sits at counsel table and is visible to 
the jury throughout the entire trial. Especially in cases where a 
death sentence could be imposed, juries are likely to observe 
the defendant closely in an attempt to find some type of 
justification in his behavior for the verdict they will render. 
Accordingly, first impressions are extremely important.  
Just as a job applicant wants to put the best foot 
forward in the initial interview, a defendant needs to be free 
from a tainted first impression. The influences shaping a 
juror’s thoughts and feelings about a particular case begin 
long before trial.37 Indeed, “the decision-making process for a 
juror in any particular case begins as soon as the juror enters 
the courtroom and starts making assessments of the people 
and information that are presented.”38 Therefore, the 
defendant is being judged as soon as the jury members are 
walking through the door. This assessment will occur whether 
or not the defendant testifies. 
Once the guilt phase of trial is completed, most states 
have much more lenient evidence rules with regard to 
mitigating factors. There is a lower burden of proof for 
mitigating factors, and relevance, as a hurdle to admissibility, 
in a capital case is lower in the sentencing phase than at any 
other time or any other type of trial. However, even when 
evidence of AS or related disorders is admitted during the 
sentencing phase of trial for mitigation purposes, the attempt 
to explain behavior is too little, too late. By the sentencing 
phase of trial, the jurors have already sat through many hours 
                                                 
37 Richard C. Waites, Are Jurors Equipped to Decide the Outcome of 
Complex Cases?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 19, 29 (2005) (citing Richard 
C. Waites, COURTROOM PSYCHOL. & TRIAL ADVOC. 535-37 (2003)). 
38 Id. 
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of trial, and they have already made up their minds as to the 
defendant’s guilt. The picture of the defendant is firmly 
situated inside the jurors’ minds, and any alternative 
explanation for the defendants’ behavior is likely futile.  
Another scholar of jury decision making conducted a 
study of capital trial jurors and premature decision making. 
What he found was quite telling. “One half of the capital 
jurors take a stand on the defendant's punishment before they 
even see the full inventory of evidence, of arguments, and of 
instructions for making the punishment decision.”39 
Furthermore, those jurors who do take an early stand “are 
absolutely convinced of their early stands and stick with them 
consistently thereafter.”40 The same scholar also noted that 
even during the penalty phase deliberations, “the same 
inability, or unwillingness, to keep the decisions separate 
appears to allow jurors to justify a death sentence simply by 
pointing to the evidence of the defendant's guilt.”41 Therefore, 
not only is it too late by the sentencing phase to change jurors’ 
minds, but the jurors will also point back to the fact that he 
was guilty in order to justify their sentencing decisions. Thus, 
the defendant’s uphill battle only steepens as the trial 
progresses. Opponents might argue juries are specifically told 
not to decide on punishment before the sentencing phase and 
are asked if they will keep an open mind throughout the trial, 
but studies show that regardless of how the jurors answer that 
question, one half have already made up their mind and will 
stick with that conclusion until the end. 
 Danger also exists in the defense looking like they are 
grasping at straws and trying to find any and every little thing 
to excuse the defendant’s behavior. A juror might wonder 
why mental condition is even being raised, because if it was an 
important fact, then it would have been raised earlier during 
                                                 
39 William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys, & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed 
Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial 
Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 
1529 (1998). 
40 Id. at 1529. 
41 Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: 
Guilt Is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is 
No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (2001). 
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the guilt phase. They may assume, therefore, mental condition 
is unimportant. 
 
VI. IN EDWARDS V. ROPER, THE DEFENDANT WAS 
DIAGNOSED WITH ASPERGER’S SYNDROME ONLY AFTER 
HIS TRIAL 
 For some, the diagnosis of AS or other developmental 
disorders comes too late. That was the case for Kimber 
Edwards, who is currently sitting on “death row.”42 Edwards 
was convicted of the first-degree murder of his ex-wife, and 
the trial court entered a death sentence in accordance with the 
jury’s recommendation.43 Prior to trial, Edwards was 
evaluated by three medical experts to determine whether he 
was competent to stand trial, and whether he had a mental 
disease or defect that could provide a defense or significant 
mitigating evidence.44  
All three experts determined Edwards was competent 
to stand trial; however, one of the experts, Dr. Cross, alerted 
the defense team that Edwards had a 25-point difference 
between his verbal and performance IQ scales which was 
indicative of a developmental disability.45 Another expert, Dr. 
Stacy, diagnosed Edwards with a pervasive developmental 
disorder (not otherwise specified).46 Yet, all three experts 
reached the same conclusion; the defendant was competent to 
stand trial and free from any mental disease or defect that 
could provide a defense or mitigation evidence. The findings 
of the experts and their conclusions seem to be at odds. No 
complete social history was formed, nor was a specific 
diagnosis given prior to trial.47 Edwards’ case continued with 
no evidence introduced of AS in either the guilt or penalty 
phase. He was convicted and received a sentence of death.48 
                                                 
42 Missouri v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511 (Mo. 2003). 
43 Id. at 520. 
44 Edwards v. Roper, No. 4:06-CV-1419, 2009 WL 3164112, at *4 (E.D. 
Mo. Sept. 28, 2009). 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at *1-3. 
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 The post-conviction team began investigations and 
again three medical experts were retained. Dr. Cross had been 
on the team of three that had examined Edwards prior to trial. 
The team was finally able to compile a complete social history 
of the defendant and diagnose him with AS.49 Dr. Logan, an 
on-board expert, opined that evidence of AS could have been 
offered to explain Edward’s abnormal demeanor and his 
inability to reach an amicable agreement with his ex-wife 
regarding child support and custody issues,50 yet this evidence 
was not even offered during the penalty phase for purposes of 
mitigation.  
The defense attorneys for Edwards’ trial even noted 
abnormal behaviors during their representation. The entire 
defense team found it extremely difficult to communicate with 
the defendant, and he demanded that his lawyers pursue 
irrelevant, time-wasting inquiries.51 Edwards also threatened 
to withhold exculpatory information from his attorneys unless 
they satisfied his demands.52 His attorneys had to spend many 
hours wasting time and going through boxes of irrelevant 
material just to try to regain the defendant’s cooperation.53 
Edwards even asked the court to remove his lawyers at 
various times through his trial.54 These behaviors are similar to 
characteristics of AS. Edwards’s special interest became the 
trial, and he obsessed and needed to control it. This obsession 
prejudiced his opportunity to receive a fair trial, and the jury 
heard no mention of any mental or social disorder.  
 The need for introduction of AS evidence was clear in 
Edwards’s case, but the appellate court was left with little 
discretion to do anything about it. Edwards’s post-conviction 
team tried to allege ineffective assistance of counsel, but to win 
on such an argument they were required to prove the 
attorney’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and Edwards was prejudiced because of the 
failure.55 To get past the first prong of this test the post-
                                                 
49 Id. at *4. 
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at *4 n.6. 
54 Edwards, 2009 WL 3164112 at *4. 
55 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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conviction team would have to “show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”56 This is a high 
burden, and the post-conviction team’s argument for 
ineffective assistance of counsel was unsuccessful.57  
The defense team did a reasonable job with the facts 
they were given and the medical records at hand, and it is 
almost impossible to speculate how a diagnosis of AS would 
have affected the outcome of the case. There are very few 
capital punishment cases nationwide involving similar issues 
and the medical studies surrounding AS are relatively new. 
Thus it is of utmost importance juries be properly informed as 
to the defendant’s medical condition so as to give an informed 
and unprejudiced decision regarding the defendant’s guilt and 
corresponding sentence. 
 
VII. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS CAN CHOOSE NOT TO INTRODUCE 
PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE AND THIS WILL BE DEEMED 
PROPER TRIAL STRATEGY 
 With the growing complexity of scientific data to be 
introduced during a capital trial, the need for expert 
psychiatric testimony increases. However, some defense 
attorneys have chosen either not to elicit an expert diagnosis 
and analysis or completely leave out expert psychiatric 
testimony altogether. The following cases illustrate how the 
decision by the attorney can negatively affect the case, but the 
courts are unwilling to classify such an attorney’s conduct as 




                                                 
56 Id. at 694. 
57 Edwards, 2009 WL 3164112 , at *12-13. 
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A. JACKSON V. UNITED STATES 
 
A potentially autistic North Carolina man was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1995.58 In 
preparation for trial, the government issued written notice to 
the defense that the government would only seek to introduce 
mental health experts in rebuttal to those introduced by the 
defense team.59 Upon review of the government’s potential 
rebuttal evidence, the defense team decided to withdraw its 
notice of intent to introduce mental health experts.60 The 
defense team also failed to elicit any further mental health 
evaluations concerning Jackson’s childhood and 
development.61 This trial strategy was deemed proper and in 
no way rising to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.62 
In other words, if a defendant does not receive the proper 
mental evaluations before trial, he is probably just out of 
luck.63 
However, denying expert testimony has not been the 
only problem for defendants and their assistance of counsel.64 
In some cases, the defense team introduces very damaging 
expert testimony, and this is still proper trial strategy. 
 
B. MORTON V. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS 
 
In a Florida case, Alvin Morton received a sentence of 
death for two 1992 murders.65 Upon appeal, Morton received a 
new sentencing hearing.66 During his first trial, Morton had a 
                                                 
58 Jackson v. United States, No. 4:06-CV-1419, 2010 WL 2775402, at *1 
(W.D.N.C. July 13, 2010). 
59 Id. at 6. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Jackson v. United States, 638 F.Supp.2d 514, 599-600 (W.D.N.C. 
2009). 
63 See id. 
64 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 (1984) (discussing 
counsel’s lack of criminal trial experience, “Every experienced 
criminal defense attorney once tried his first criminal case[,]. . . but it 
does not justify a presumption of ineffectiveness. . . .”). 
65 Morton v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Corr., 684 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th 
Cir. 2012).  
66 Id. at 1164. 
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psychiatric expert testify for mitigation purposes.67 This expert 
testified that Morton had a mixed personality disorder with 
emotional instability.68 After giving the diagnosis, the expert 
seemed to totally undermine Morton’s plea for mercy.69 The 
expert said Morton’s “ability to develop into a more fully 
functioning individual was extremely limited,”70 and that 
“given the state of the art and what we know, I would have a 
difficult time saying we could cure [Morton’s] disorder.”71  
The expert went on to compare Morton’s situation with 
that of a serial killer, which only made Morton look even 
worse to the jury.72 During the new sentencing hearing, 
Morton’s attorney decided that even though the expert 
testimony did more harm than good, they would have the 
expert testify again at the second sentencing hearing.73 Morton 
was again sentenced to die.74 The appellate courts 
subsequently held that offering damaging expert testimony as 
to Morton’s mental condition was proper trial strategy.75 
Again, these cases illustrate the importance of a correct 
diagnosis and helpful expert testimony.76 Without these two 
things, a defense attorney’s case is at a great disadvantage.77  
 
VIII. IN PEOPLE V. MACKLEM, PROSECUTORS REBUTTED 
EVIDENCE OF ASPERGER’S SYNDROME WITH 
IRRELEVANT BUT PERSUASIVE NEUROLOGICAL 
EVIDENCE 
 In People v. Macklem, the State of California originally 
sought the death penalty, but subsequently dropped the 
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pursuit for a death sentence in the joinder motion to 
consolidate the murder of Macklem’s ex-girlfriend and the 
assault upon his prison cellmate.78 Macklem was diagnosed 
with AS as a juvenile.79  
At the age of 18, Macklem killed his ex-girlfriend, 
Sarah Beagle.80 While awaiting trial, Macklem also attacked his 
cellmate with a PVC pipe.81 Luckily for Macklem, the trial 
court allowed expert testimony about AS in front of the jury.82 
The expert was allowed to testify about Macklem’s mental 
state and how AS affected a person’s thinking and behaviors.83 
Unfortunately for Macklem, the prosecutors came up with a 
way to rebut this evidence and convince the jury that the AS 
evidence was, in essence, “hogwash.”84 The state offered 
psychological evidence that there were no neurological, 
structural, or functional abnormalities that would explain or 
affect the defendant’s behavior.85   Yet AS and similar 
disorders in the autistic spectrum are characterized and 
diagnosed purely by observable behaviors.86 An absence of 
visible deformities or damage to the brain does not equate to 
the lack of mental disorder.  
 Medical scholar Charlotte Schwarz published an article 
in 2009 attempting to explain how jurors respond to different 
types of expert psychiatric testimony.87 She noted that use of 
neuro-scientific data in courts is becoming more routine as 
psychiatry has shifted toward biological models.88 New 
medical technology has produced functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), an increasingly accessible scanning 
technique that measures changes in brain blood-oxygen levels 
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to indirectly chart thought and behavior.89 Despite these 
advances, Schwarz cautions, “the admissibility and 
immediacy of this data create a misleading aura of scientific 
infallibility,”90 because “there is not and will never be a brain 
correlate for responsibility.”91 Schwarz’s article points out 
what most people already know: a jury is an unpredictable 
group who will make decision based on whatever they wish, 
regardless of law or science. 
Included in Schwarz’s article was Jessica Gurley and 
David Marcus’s examination of 396 mock jurors and how they 
responded to various categories of psychiatric and 
psychological evidence.92 The subjects studied were 
significantly more likely to declare a defendant not guilty by 
reason of insanity when the mock attorneys presented neuro-
images or brain injury testimony to the jury.93 The fMRI scans 
give the jury a visual connection to testimony about brain 
functions, but the scans are too variable from person to person 
to serve as a means for identifying culpability; what one 
would classify as normal brain features have yet to be 
determined.94  
There are certain brain deficiencies and mental 
illnesses such as mood disorders caused by disease of the 
basal ganglia that have detectable physiological traits; 
however, they are the exception, not the rule.95 Observable 
defects from neural images do not directly correspond to 
severity of a condition, but their vividness has a 
disproportionate effect on jurors who tend to discount less 
tangible chemical imbalances.96 The mock jurors were four 
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times more likely to convict a psychopath than a defendant 
with visible damage from head trauma.97 There is no rational 
explanation for this result. A psychopath’s condition could 
render him or her insane, and the person with visible damage 
from head trauma could reasonably have little or no mental 
effect from the damage. It seems unjust that the lack of visible 
damage or visible charting of blood-oxygen levels could keep 
some defendants from receiving a fair trial. 
The inherent problems of mixing the medical and legal 
fields as described by Schwarz seem to be a big part of 
Macklem’s problems. Even though the defense was able to 
introduce the evidence of AS, the prosecution had no problem 
rebutting the evidence by pointing out no neurological or 
structural abnormalities existed.98 Macklem had a number of 
circumstances working against him. He had no visible 
damages or defects for the expert to show, his mental 
condition exists purely through observable behaviors, and 
there already exists a certain stigma around disorders in the 
autistic spectrum. Autism and its milder forms are highly 
complex and greatly misunderstood by most of society. 
Hollywood movies feature characters with autism, and some 
of these characters are extremely smart.99 Many people assume 
that someone with AS or HFA is highly intelligent, has an 
excellent memory, and is good with numbers. It is quite 
difficult to fit this stereotype with any lesser form of 
culpability. In general, people believe that intelligent persons 
should be held responsible for their actions.  
Macklem was found to have an average IQ even 
though he tested below average in areas of memory, thought 
processing, and academic skills.100 Luckily for him, the trial 
judge allowed expert testimony of how AS affects persons 
with the disorder. The expert was able to testify that AS is 
demonstrated by “impaired social interaction, attention 
problems, rigid behaviors, and fantasy thoughts.”101 The 
expert also explained that persons with AS generally have few 
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friends, struggle with romantic relationships, go into rages 
and act out, and cannot explain or understand their 
behavior.102 He also noted that persons with AS are capable of 
manipulating situations to get what they want and generally 
do not care about how their behavior impacts or affects 
others.103  
This information was helpful considering that 
Macklem, before the crime, had conversations with his ex-
girlfriend where she asked him to kill her to put her out of her 
misery.104 Macklem often fantasized about killing her because 
he thought he would be helping her.105 Sarah was also 
depressed about the death of a family member, and Macklem 
thought that by killing Sarah, she would be with that family 
member again.106 The expert testimony likely helped connect 
the dots and explain part of Macklem’s thought process and 
also why Macklem would have lacked remorse or sympathy 
for Sarah or her family.  
Surely, the expert testimony did not fall upon deaf ears 
because Macklem only received a sentence of 25 years to life. 
He was eligible for the death penalty, and the state of 
California is not shy about pursuing it, but after discovery had 
begun, the prosecutors chose not to pursue it. The record does 
not reflect the state’s reason for dropping pursuit of a death 
sentence, but if prosecutors knew what the expert testimony 
was going to entail, then it was a smart move on their part. 
Macklem’s case stands for the proposition that evidence of AS 
should be introduced in every criminal trial, especially when 
death is a possible sentence. Competent psychiatric 




 Being diagnosed with a disorder in the autism 
spectrum does not equate to a lack of intent to commit a crime, 
but it does have a direct effect on a person’s mind and how the 
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mind perceives things. Not all persons with AS are 
automatically incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by 
reason of insanity. Evidence of AS is needed merely to help 
the jury make an informed decision. Suppressing such 
evidence denies the jury of highly relevant and crucial 
information. By hearing/viewing evidence of how AS affects 
persons, the jury is able to connect all the dots and properly 
decide whether the defendant had the subjective intent to 
commit the crime. Persons with AS do not deserve a “get out 
of jail free card,” but they deserve to offer before the jury all 
evidence relevant to culpability and mitigation.
